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Abstract
In recent years the Province of Ontario has enabled municipalities to adopt
accommodation taxes as a revenue generating tool. There is an absence of data in Canada
as to what this revenue is being utilized for. Most of the literature on the topic comes out of
the United States and Europe, where hotel and accommodation taxes have been
commonplace for many years, although a lot of the research focuses on the impacts of
accommodation taxes on tourism. Hypothesising that the accommodation tax in Ontario is
being utilized as a revenue-generating tool to offset other line items in municipal budgets,
this paper examines municipalities in Ontario that have imposed an accommodation tax
and the utilization of the funds generated. The research question being examined is what
Ontario municipalities are doing with the Municipal Accommodation Tax (MAT) revenue
that they have discretion over. This paper uses an inductive research strategy involving
observation through various publicly available content, such as by-laws, staff reports,
budget documents and meeting minutes to determine what municipalities are doing with
the revenue from the MAT. The analysis reveals most municipalities in Ontario are
allocating all, or at least part, of the revenue that they have discretion over to tourism
initiatives.
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Introduction
Prior to the 1960s, tourism-specific taxes did not exist. However, worldwide there
are now over forty different types of taxes levied on tourism (Heffer-Flaata et al., 2021:
749). Accommodation taxes, also commonly known in other jurisdiction as “hotel taxes”,
“lodging tax” and/or “tourist tax”, have grown in popularity stemming “from the widely
held perception that its burden is largely borne by tourists rather than residents, with little
negative impact on industry sales” (Bonham et al., 1992: 433). Canada has been slower to
adopt accommodation taxes than other jurisdictions like the United States and Europe,
which have imposed these types of taxes for a longer period of time. In 2017 via legislative
changes, the Province of Ontario provided municipalities with the ability to levy a
Municipal Accommodations Tax (MAT), which is a tax that is added to short-term
accommodations of all kinds, including hotel stays, bed and breakfasts and short-term
rentals such as AirBnB (O. Reg. 435/17).
Accommodation taxes are “generally regarded as easier means to generate revenue
for regional administrative bodies, as they are primarily ‘exported’ to visitors” (Lee, 2014:
49). In their 2021 article, Plzakova and Studnicka note that “the local taxation of tourism
services is one of the very significant tools of local self-government and can be used for
saturating the increased burden on public spaces and the use of public property and
services in the territory of the municipality not only by residents but also by non-residents”
(66). The ability to levy such a tax, that primarily impacts tourists, is relatively new in
Ontario.
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The amount generated from tourism taxes can be substantial. Hudson et al. note in
their 2021 article that in 2017 “New York City took in US$582.5 million in lodging tax
revenue, up over US$200 million since 2010” (206). Given the potential for large amounts
of revenue, it is a worthwhile area of study to investigate how these funds are being spent.
Another reason that this research is relevant is that many municipalities are facing revenue
challenges as the main source of revenue for municipalities is the property tax. As will be
outlined below in the literature review, there are academics who believe the property tax is
an underutilized tool for generating revenue for municipalities and that the property tax
itself should be enough to meet municipal revenue needs. However, due to several factors,
sometimes increases in property taxes are not sufficient to keep up with municipal needs,
particularly for infrastructure. Raising property taxes is seen as politically unpopular, so
many municipalities are requesting further taxation powers from the Province to raise
revenues through alternate means. An example of this is the accommodation tax.
The Ontario regulation, O. Reg. 435/17, that provides the ability to levy the tax via
by-law, also prescribes what a portion of the revenue must be used for (O. Reg. 435/17, s. 4
– 5). For most municipalities in Ontario, the formula used in the regulation stipulates that
50% of the revenue must be provided to an eligible tourism entity as defined by the
legislation and the municipality has discretion over the remaining 50% of the revenue (O.
Reg. 435/17, s. 5). However, in the case of municipalities that had a destination marketing
program in existence when the MAT was imposed, the formula for calculating how the
funds are to be used is slightly different. The formula stipulates that the eligible tourism
entity must receive at least as much funding as was provided via the destination marketing
program in the fiscal year prior to the MAT being imposed (O. Reg. 435/17, s. 4). This paper
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focuses on the portion of the funding that municipalities have discretion over. The research
question that this paper will explore is: How are municipalities in Ontario utilizing the
Municipal Accommodation Tax (MAT) revenue that they have discretion over?
The Province of Ontario will likely continue to receive pressure from municipalities
to permit additional revenue generating tools other than the property tax in the years to
come. For this reason, looking at how municipalities use the accommodation tax dollars
will be an important indicator of how municipalities may use revenue from future taxation
tools. The MAT is a low hanging fruit in terms of looking at additional revenue generating
tools. The tax is unlikely to impact residents of a municipality directly due to the tax being
imposed on visitors staying in hotels, motels, short-term rentals and other types of
transient accommodations, so it is a more politically appealing tax to implement that will
also help to raise revenues.
Gago et al. outlined four main rationales for taxing tourism: the opportunity for
significant revenue, lowering the fiscal burden on local residents, the tax acting as a price
substitute for the goods and services that tourists consume, and to correct negative
externalities, such as the strain on the destination’s natural resources, public transport and
general infrastructure (2009). The implementation of the municipal accommodation tax
may just be the first of many taxation options made available to municipalities in order to
raise revenue instead of relying largely on the property tax to do so. As such, it is an
important area of study to see how municipalities utilize alternative taxation to generate
revenue.
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This paper will begin with an overview of the literature regarding revenue
generation in Canada and the literature on accommodation taxes in the United States and
Europe. Then a detailed overview of the methodology and research design will be set out,
along with its limitations, utilizing case studies as practical examples. Lastly, the findings of
this research will be analyzed, and areas of possible future research will be proposed.

Literature Review
Introduction
There is a lot of literature available on municipal revenue in Canada, but none seems
to focus on the use of a municipal accommodation tax specifically. If the use of an
accommodation tax is explored, it is typically briefly mentioned and there does not appear
to be a lot of standalone research on the issue. However, there is research on
accommodation taxes (also called hotel taxes, resort fees, occupancy taxes, etc. in the
literature) in the United States and Europe, where these types of taxes are more common
and have been used for a longer duration. There is also research on local option sales taxes
from the United States. The literature review will first focus on the Canadian landscape of
municipal revenue generation and then shift focus to specifically detail available research
on accommodation taxes from the United States and Europe.
Taxation and Revenue Generation in Canada
A lot of the existing literature in Canada looks at the use of property taxation and
explores the use of a municipal personal income tax and/or a municipal sales tax as means
of increasing municipal revenues. The use of a municipal sales tax in the existing literature
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is broader than an accommodation tax as it applies to all sales within a municipality, not
sales focused solely on accommodation, which tends to impact visitors/tourists the most.
There is also literature on local option sales taxes from the United States, but again, this is a
broader tax, as it is a taxation on everything within a local area, not just tax on
accommodations.
In their 2016 article, Kitchen and Slack explore the use of various revenue raising
tools based on observed examples used in other jurisdictions. They explore things like user
fees, road pricing/taxation, parking charges, taxes on personal income, taxes on municipal
sales, vehicle registration, fuel and hotel stays. Kitchen and Slack ultimately determine that
a mix of taxes would be the best way to increase municipal revenues, specifically a personal
income tax and a municipal sales tax (2016: 2). For personal income, the authors estimate
revenues that would be generated as a result of implementing a 1% municipal tax on this
income. With respect to a municipal sales tax, they again use a 1% mark to estimate
revenues that would be generated from this (Kitchen and Slack, 2016: 21 - 22).
The authors do not speak to the political feasibility of implementing these types of
taxes. In addition, they suggest that it would be more expensive to administer an increase
in property taxes, which does not make a lot of sense since municipalities already have well
established property taxation systems. If new revenue sources are to be used, an entirely
new system/process for collecting these would need to be created rather than leveraging a
system that is already in place. In addition, a weakness of this study is that the analysis is
limited to eight large Canadian cities that are used as case studies in the paper. The study
would not likely be applicable to small or medium sized municipalities in Canada, which
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limits the scope of the findings. This study is focused on the use of a personal income tax
and a general municipal sales tax, not a tax specifically targeted at accommodations, which
further limits its applicability to the research contained in this paper.
Other academics, such as McMillan and Dahlby suggest that the property tax alone is
a sufficient source of revenue for municipalities. In their 2014 paper, McMillan and Dahlby
look at whether other revenue generating tools such as a personal income tax or a
municipal sales tax are necessary for municipalities to raise revenues. In their
examination, they conclude that the property tax should continue to be used as the main
revenue generating tool for municipalities (McMillan and Dahlby, 2014: 24). In their
article, they note that as a percentage of income, the municipal property tax burden has not
been increasing, so there is adequate room to grow this tax without needing to look to
other types of taxes to increase revenues (McMillan and Dahlby, 2014: 6).
The authors also point out that the property tax is a relatively stable type of tax
versus personal or municipal sales taxes where the revenue generated could be subject to a
high degree of volatility. In addition, the authors note the high degree of administration
that would be required to implement something like a municipal sales tax that does not
currently exist (McMillan and Dahlby, 2014: 23). The study is limited as the sample is only
made up of some municipalities in Alberta, so it is not clear if their assessment would stand
if it was applied to all municipalities in Alberta. In addition, it may be difficult to generalize
these findings to other provinces in Canada, where incomes may have not kept pace in the
same way as Alberta, which is the rationale used that makes an increase in property tax the
most feasible solution according to the authors. Again, this study is not focused on an
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accommodation tax, but discusses the property tax and the idea of a general municipal
sales tax. A general municipal sales tax is not targeted at accommodations only and is
generally estimated at a lower rate in the literature (i.e. 1%) versus the 4% municipal
accommodation tax rate that many municipalities in Ontario have chosen.
A 2015 paper by Tassonyi, Bird and Slack also examined the question of whether
municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) could raise property taxes. The authors
concluded that the property tax has the capacity to meet the financial needs of GTA
municipalities to a larger extent than it currently does (Tassonyi, Bird and Slack, 2015: 1).
Like McMillan and Dahlby, these authors suggest there is capacity within the property tax
system which can be utilized to fund needed municipal expenditures. Tassonyi, Bird and
Slack speak to “revenue hills”, where a region can increase taxation to a certain point (the
“revenue maximizing point” or peak of the revenue hill), after which if the tax rate
continues to increase, the region will actually see declining tax revenue (i.e. from
individuals leaving the high tax rate area or finding ways to avoid the higher taxes, etc.)
(2015: 3).
The authors conclude that no region in the GTA is at the peak of the revenue hill for
residential property taxes: that each municipality studied could increase revenue by raising
the tax rate, with one exception (Tassonyi, Bird and Slack, 2015: 5). However, the authors
note there are considerable variations in the amount of space left to do so until a
municipality reaches the peak of the revenue hill. The notable outlier here is Durham
Region, which the authors note is at its peak or “revenue maximizing point” and if the tax
rate is increased further, this is expected to result in a loss of revenue (Tassonyi, Bird and
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Slack, 2015: 17). Again, this is another study that focuses on increasing revenue via
increases to the property tax rather than looking at alternative tools to generate revenue.
Similarly, a report authored in 2017 by Frank Clayton for Ryerson’s University
Centre for Urban Research & Land Development states that in comparison to other GTA
municipalities, the City of Toronto has plenty of room for increasing residential property
taxes (2017: 1). Clayton looks at average property taxes paid among GTA municipalities,
the effective property tax rate (defined as property tax as a percentage of market value of
the property) and the property tax burden (property tax as a percentage of household
income) (2017: 2). Clayton concludes that Toronto’s effective property tax rate is the
lowest of any GTA municipality, and 23% below the median effective tax rate for the 25
GTA municipalities studied (excluding the City of Toronto). In addition, Clayton notes that
Toronto’s property tax burden was 17% below the median percentage for the 25
municipalities examined (excluding Toronto) (2017: 6). Clayton concludes that due to this
comparison, the City of Toronto has a lot of room to increase taxes. As noted above, a lot of
the existing literature is focused on the property tax as a means to increase municipal
revenues. This could be because it is already an existing power that municipalities have.
For a lot of other revenue generating tools considered by the literature, Provincial
permission would be required. Perhaps this is why there is an absence of research in this
area in Canada – any research would be mostly speculative and involve estimating
revenues versus being able to provide concrete examples.
In their 2015 article, Block and Weiss suggest that Toronto has a revenue problem
due to the fact that property tax increases were lower than inflation and did not increase
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with population growth (2015: 7). They state that this has led to a diminishing capacity for
Toronto to maintain its vital services. Block and Weiss advocate for utilizing powers
Toronto was granted in the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (COTA) (2017: 8 – 10) as additional
revenue generating tools. While Block and Weiss note that the COTA prohibits a blanket
municipal sales tax, the COTA does provide an exemption for certain items to be taxed.
Block and Weiss estimated revenues that would be generated from taxes on items such as
sales of cigarettes, alcohol and entertainment (movie admissions, live sports and other
performances, etc.). In addition, they estimated revenues that could be generated from
things like road tolls, taxing non-residential parking spaces and the vehicle registration tax.
They highlight that increasing property taxes by less than the rate of inflation is
unsustainable because it is the city’s most reliable source of revenue and this will cause it
to continually lag behind the city’s actual fiscal needs. Block and Weiss conclude that the
city must catch up on forgone property tax revenues as well as utilize existing revenue
generating tools permitted under COTA (2017: 11). While this paper speaks to the revenue
issue, it does not involve data on a full municipal sales tax as is the case in the United States.
In addition, it speaks to revenue estimates from other revenue generating tools, but not a
municipal accommodation tax specifically.

Local Option Sales Taxes
There is not a lot of Canadian data on municipal sales taxes, but research has been
conducted on a similar concept in the United States, except it is generally called a local
option sales tax rather than a municipal sales tax. Both have the same premise – there
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would be a special tax added to all sales within a specific geographical area – but they go by
different names. McMillan and Dahlby briefly touch on local option sales taxes in their
2014 paper mentioned above, however their assessment is completed using examples from
the United States, which may not be easily applicable to the Canadian experience.
In her 2014 paper, Afonso examines the use of local options sales taxes in the United
States. She uses statistical analysis to determine whether local option sales taxes are used
to reduce property taxes and increase own source revenues in the jurisdictions in which
they are used. Afonso hypothesizes that the use of local option sales taxes will reduce
property tax burdens and increase own source revenue (2014: 26). The data used to test
the hypothesis is made up of counties in 35 states, of which 17 states allowed counties to
implement a local option sales tax during the time period of the study (1983 – 2004), while
18 did not. The remaining 15 states that were not included in the analysis did not maintain
records of the local option sales tax rate by county for the time period covered by the study
(Afonso, 2014: 31).
The ultimate outcome is that Afonso’s hypothesis is correct – local option sales tax
revenue is used to both decease property tax revenue and increase own source revenue per
capita (Afonso, 2014: 39). Afonso notes that a limitation of the study is the fact that there is
no guarantee a local option sales tax will produce the revenue desired by municipal
leaders, especially when taking into consideration the size of the tax base and that of
neighbouring municipalities (which may or may not have their own local option sales tax)
(2017: 41). Again, this study may be of limited application due to the fact that it deals with
a general municipal sales tax versus a targeted tax on accommodations. In addition, the
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outcomes in the United States may not be generalizable to Canada. However, it does
provide interesting information on the impact on property taxes when a municipality
begins to rely on alternative sources of revenue.
The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) published a paper in 2017 that
advocated for a 1% tax to be added to the existing HST where that 1% would be allocated
to municipalities – called “The Local Share”. AMO states that this 1% municipal sales tax
would be used to fund the infrastructure financing gap facing municipalities (2017: 6). In
support of its paper, AMO relies mostly on data from the United States, where AMO asserts
that 25 states permit a local sales tax of at least 1%. In the paper, AMO also mentions a list
of other revenue generating tools that were examined in their research, including a hotel or
accommodation tax. However, the mention of an accommodation tax is very limited and is
not examined in any level of detail in the paper. The other revenue generating tools that
are discussed in at least brief detail in the paper are powers available to the City of Toronto
under the COTA, such as taxes on alcohol, tobacco, entertainment and vehicle registration.

Revenue Generation and Accommodation Taxes Internationally
Although there is a lack of research available in Canada on accommodation taxes,
there is research available from jurisdictions where accommodation taxes are common and
have been around for a longer period, such as the United States and Europe. A lot of this
research on accommodation taxes focuses on whether the imposition of accommodation
taxes has an impact on tourism. Heffer-Flaata et al. note that “the positive and negative
aspects of tourism taxes are well established, though the literature is far from consensus on
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which effect dominates” (2021: 750). In line with the hypothesis of this paper, Cetin et al.
note that funds collected through tourism should be spent in areas related to tourism,
however “this is not the case in the majority of destinations, as studies have shown, where
local governments regard taxes from tourism industry as free revenue, since tourists are
unlikely to vote” (Cetin et al., 2017: 4).
In their 2021 article, Plzakova and Studnicka note that “in recent years there has
been a rapid increase in the number of municipalities applying local taxes (charges and
fees) related to the performance of the tourism, hotel and spa industries in the European
Union member states” (2021: 70). Although fees such as accommodation taxes have existed
for many years, it appears they are growing in popularity. This is demonstrated in Ontario
by the fact that these types of taxes were not permitted by the Provincial Government until
late 2017.
Further, in explaining the use of fees and charges in Europe, Plzakova and Studnicka
note that “local charges and fees are only rarely related to a certain purpose…so that the
collected money generated from them must be reinvested in the support of the
development of tourism in a specific territory” (2021: 70). This contrasts with Ontario,
where the legislation mandates that a specific portion of revenues from accommodation
taxes must be allocated for tourism initiatives. As will be discussed later in this literature
review, some jurisdictions treat the taxes as a revenue generating tool to reduce the burden
on residents, with only a small portion being dedicated to tourism initiatives.
The literature on whether accommodation taxes are a positive or negative for the
region in which they are imposed is mixed. Lee’s 2014 article looking at comparator
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municipalities Midland and Odessa, Texas in the United States found that “hotels competing
for similar demand without occupancy taxes are likely to be in a comparative advantage
over the hotels that are subject to the occupancy tax” (53). Using a random effects spatial
model, Lee found significant evidence of competitive disadvantage created by the adoption
of the hotel tax and corresponding higher prices for hotels in Midland versus Odessa (2014:
54). Similarly, Collins and Stephenson researched the impact of the introduction of a $5 per
night hotel tax in Georgia in 2015. They used monthly hotel occupancy and price data from
50 states in the United States to conclude “that the tax reduced the number of rooms rented
in Georgia by about 92,000 per month and that hotel operators were not able to fully shift
the tax to travelers” (Collins and Stephenson, 2018: 11). Both papers found that the
addition of a hotel tax disadvantaged those regions where it was imposed.
This is contrasted with research conducted by Heffer-Flaata et al. that studied the
impact of tourist taxes on outbound UK travel demand. Their results indicate that tourist
taxes only sometimes had an impact on demand, depending on the destination and time of
year travelled. For popular destinations, “the numbers of UK arrivals to the largest taxed
destinations in each country…do not seem to be significantly affected by the taxes” (HefferFlaata et al., 2021: 756). When discussing timing of vacations, the researchers noted that
“during the peak summer period, both French and Spanish cities are, overall, negatively
affected… [by tourist taxes], while the impact on Italian destinations is not significant”
(Heffer-Flaata et al., 2021: 756). Heffer Flaata et al. note that market power of the
destination has an impact on whether tourist taxes impact demand, with desirable and
popular tourist spots being more resilient to accommodation taxes (2021: 756 – 758). This
is similar to the findings of Bonham et al., who studied the impact of a hotel room tax
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increase in Hawaii. They found the tax did not have a significant negative effect on hotel
revenues, theorizing this was because a 5% increase in lodging expenditure represents less
than 1.5% of the total cost of a typical vacation in Hawaii (Bonham et al., 1992: 439).
There were interesting insights into how various municipalities in the United States
are utilizing the revenue from accommodation taxes that they have imposed in Hudson et
al.’s 2021 article. The authors studied the effect of lodging tax increases in eight different
locations in the United States – seven cities and one state. As part of their research, they
noted the City of Chicago’s high tax rate on lodging of 17.4%, with two increases within the
last six years (Hudson et al., 2021: 211). They highlighted that the “most recent 1%
increase in 2016 generated US$474 million of extra income yearly, which was earmarked
largely for government worker pension costs” (Hudson et al., 2021: 211). This is notable, as
this is clearly a portion of the tax that is not being used for tourism initiatives and instead is
entirely meant to help the city’s finances and long-term pension obligations.
In contrast, the City of Cincinnati, whose lodging tax increased in 2013 from 8.27%
to 11.77%, utilizes the revenue to cover construction debt on several convention centres
and “it currently infuses cash into marketing campaigns designed to drum up tourism and
convention business” (Hudson et al., 2021: 211). Another case where hotel taxes are used
exclusively for tourism is El Paso, Texas. Here, hotel tax revenues must be spent to enhance
and promote tourism and the tax was increased in 2012 from 15.5% to 17.5% to support
the funding of a new baseball stadium (Hudson et al., 2021: 212). These are both examples
of cities who primarily use the revenue for funding only tourism-related infrastructure and
initiatives.
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An example of a hybrid of the two approaches is Riverside, California. Hudson et al.
noted that between 2012 and 2014, the city increased its lodging taxes from 11 to 13% to
increase tourism and promote the destination but noted that the “city also planned on
using the money to help repair aging buildings and replace city assets” (2021: 211).
Another example is the municipality of Gilbert, Arizona. In 2013, lodging taxes were
increased from 8.27% to 11.77% and “the city unanimously voted to modify the lodging tax
and use the proceeds collected from the increase to support general operations of the city”
(Hudson et al., 2021: 212). In this case study, revenue was previously devoted to tourism,
but the city voted to increase the tax charged and reallocate the resulting increase in funds
to general municipal coffers.
Another insightful line of research looks at whether revenue from accommodation
taxes is being spent in accordance with the stated purpose of these funds. In their 2006
article, Litvin, Crotts, Blackwell and Styles look at the expenditure of accommodations tax
revenue in South Carolina. In the article, they note that most states in the United States
“promote tourism with funds generated by taxing their visitors” (Litvin et al., 2006:150).
The authors point to two differing opinions on accommodation taxes: those who oppose
the tax or support it only if the funds are provided directly to tourism initiatives, and those
that “see tourism taxes as ‘free’ revenue, because their burden generally falls on
nonconstituent tourists rather than local citizens” (Litvin et al., 2006: 150).
In the article, the authors provide an overview of the accommodation tax legislative
structure in South Carolina. They note that “the first $25,000 and 5% of the balance is
directed to the municipality or county government’s general fund to be spent in any
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manner the local government sees fit; 30% of the remaining balance is allocated to a
special account dedicated to the advertising and promotion of tourism… and the remaining
65% balance is deposited in a special fund earmarked specifically for local tourism-related
expenditures” (Litvin et al., 2006: 152). The authors then detail a list of categories where
the 65% of the funds is authorized to be spent in areas such as advertising of tourism;
promotion of cultural events; construction of facilities for cultural activities; and funding of
the criminal justice system, health facilities and solid waste collection.
As a result of their research, the authors found that “more funds were spent
providing facilities and public services…than were allocated to the promotion of events”
(Litvin et al., 2006: 155). The authors distinguish between “hygienic” and “motivational”
expenditures, stating that hygienic expenditures are to provide facilities and public
services, whereas motivational expenditures were allocated to the promotion of events
(Litvin et al., 2006: 155). The authors conclude that “those municipalities that have
allocated accommodations tax monies for purposes such as garbage removal, policing, and
maintenance in the tourism zone, all legal per the tax laws, are simply funding hygienic
necessities they would have provided in any case from their general funds…with the likely
result that “motivational expenditures, to include creating and sponsoring festivals and
special events to attract new visitors, get squeezed from the budget” (Litvin et al., 2006:
155).
There are limitations to the study since the authors excluded data from the fifteen
largest tourism entities in South Carolina as they deemed these “outliers” where the hotel
revenue exceeded $20 million annually. The authors justified their decision in an attempt
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to eliminate the competing influences from these higher traffic tourist areas. They note
that within these areas, the accommodation tax is one of only several viable sources of
revenue. The authors felt excluding these areas would allow a clearer picture of the
relationship among the variables they tested in their study (Litvin et al., 2006: 153). It is
interesting to note that the findings were that if a municipality allocates the funding to
more of the “necessity” expenditures, it was less likely to fund more of the purely tourismrelated initiatives. This aligns with the hypothesis of this paper that municipalities may be
using the discretionary funds to supplement their own budget line items rather than
devote these funds to tourism funding or using these funds to supplement tourism
initiatives.
As demonstrated above, research specifically on the use of a municipal
accommodation tax in Ontario or Canada is extremely limited. The existing literature on
municipal revenues and alternative revenue sources in Canada seems to be very focused on
the property tax as well as other hypothetical taxes such as a tax on personal income
and/or a broad municipal sales tax. Permitting additional revenue generating sources such
as an accommodation tax appears to be relatively new in Canada despite this being
common in other jurisdictions for many years. However, there is research available
regarding the use of accommodation taxes in the United States and Europe which provides
insights. The literature is mixed in terms of whether these taxes are good or bad for the
jurisdictions in which they are levied, although they are widely popular and present in
most states and countries in Europe. The Ontario legislation permits municipalities
discretion over a certain portion of the accommodation tax revenue but does require a
prescribed portion to go to tourism initiatives. The United States literature provides insight
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into the expenditure of this revenue and the fact that some jurisdictions allocate this to
tourism spending, some allocate to tourism and other general expenditures of the
municipality, while others use the additional taxation to line municipal coffers for general
purposes.

Research Design and Methodology:
Research Aim and Question
This research and paper look to examine what municipalities in Ontario are doing
with the MAT revenue that they have discretion over and whether this is being used as a
revenue generating tool for municipal coffers, being utilized for tourism initiatives or a
hybrid of the two approaches. The research question that this paper will explore is: How
are municipalities in Ontario utilizing the Municipal Accommodation Tax (MAT) revenue
that they have discretion over?
Framework, Data Sources and Limitations
The research strategy used in this paper involves working from observation through
looking at various publicly available content such as by-laws, staff reports, budget
documents and meeting minutes, to come up with a determination of what municipalities
are doing with the revenue from the MAT that they have discretion over. The goal of the
research is to identify trends in how municipalities are allocating this revenue. Some bylaws and many staff reports contained information as to what is the intended use of the
revenue that is not prescribed to be allocated to a specific tourism purpose by the
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legislation. In addition, looking at budget documentation provided insight into where
municipalities have allocated the accommodation tax revenues.
The research involves all 444 municipalities in Ontario and the sample used to
determine the findings in this paper includes all municipalities in Ontario that have
approved and/or implemented a MAT as of the end of May, 2021.
The Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing has a list on their website
which details the names of every municipality in Ontario, its municipal status (lower tier,
upper tier, single tier) as well as the geographic area that the municipality is located in.
The first step in collecting the information needed to answer the research question was to
eliminate upper-tier municipalities from the scope of the research. The MAT is one that is
implemented by a lower-tier municipality, or a single-tier municipality in those
jurisdictions that do not have an upper and lower-tier structure. Based on excluding the
upper-tier municipalities, 414 of 444 total municipalities in Ontario remain relevant to the
research question. The remaining 414 municipalities were examined to determine which
have approved a staff report to implement a MAT and/or passed a by-law to implement a
MAT. Only those municipalities that have either approved a MAT to be implemented and/
or passed a by-law as of May 31, 2021 have been included in the scope of the research.
To make a determination as to which municipalities in Ontario have either approved
the implementation of a MAT and/or passed a MAT by-law, each municipality’s website
was visited to search for documentation, by-laws, Council agendas, budget documents and
meeting minutes pertaining to accommodation taxes. On each website, provided the
functionality was available, a general search was conducted for the following terms:
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“accommodation tax”, “435/17” and “MAT”. While the search terms “accommodation tax”
and “MAT” may be self-explanatory, the “435/17” search term denotes the numbers for the
Ontario Regulation that permits the passing of a by-law to impose an accommodation tax.
Reference to the regulation would often be found in the preamble to the by-law and/or
referenced in staff reports, presentations and Council documents discussing the ability to
impose an accommodation tax. If a municipality had passed a MAT by-law, often these
searches would turn up the by-law itself and/or associated staff reports and Council
documentation approving the implementation of an accommodation tax.
In addition to the general search, if a municipality had a publicly available
repository of council agendas and minutes, the search terms “accommodation tax”, “MAT”
and “435/17” would be searched in the repository to see if any matches appeared. This
extra step was taken as the general search functions on some municipal websites were not
always the best at returning relevant results. It was important to include additional
searches that may reveal the existence of a MAT staff report and/or by-law that did not
appear in the general search function.
On top of using search functions on each municipality’s website (if available), each
municipality’s website would be checked for a “by-law” subsection or webpage. Many
municipalities either had an entire repository of every by-law that had been passed (at
least in recent years) available online, or listings of the most frequently accessed or
requested by-laws. If a municipality posted a repository of all by-laws passed, the by-laws
from 2017 to 2021 would be reviewed to see if a MAT by-law had been passed. For those
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municipalities with a frequently requested by-law list, the list would be reviewed for the
existence of a MAT by-law.
Lastly, a general Google search of the municipality name and the words
“accommodation tax” was conducted for each municipality. Often if an accommodation tax
was being discussed at a Council meeting, it was being reported in the local news as the
imposition of accommodation taxes were controversial in some jurisdictions, with vocal
proponents and opponents. If the various searches being conducted on a municipal website
did not reveal the existence of an accommodation tax, a local news story would often
indicate whether an accommodation tax had been imposed. Based on the date of the news
article, specific committee and/or council meeting agendas could be pinpointed for review
on municipality websites from that same period of time to find the associated staff reports
and meeting minutes.
It should also be noted that the information was very easily accessible for a lot of the
municipalities with mid-sized and larger populations, such as the City of Toronto or City of
Markham. For some municipalities, they had entire webpages on their websites dedicated
to information regarding their accommodation taxes, including necessary documentation,
copies of the by-law, associated staff reports and answers to frequently asked questions.
There are limitations with the way that the data was collected regarding whether a
municipality had passed an accommodation tax by-law. It is possible that a municipality
that has approved the implementation of a MAT may have been missed given only
documentation available online was used to make a determination as to whether or not a
MAT had been approved for implementation and/or a MAT by-law had been passed by the
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municipality. The research did not include definitively confirming this information by
contacting the Clerk for each municipality. Some municipalities, particularly those with
lower populations, had archaic websites that made searching for this information difficult,
or sometimes the websites simply looked as if they had not been updated in a long time. It
is possible that some of these municipalities could have approved implementation of a MAT
and/or passed a by-law, but this information was simply not available online.
While not a definitive factor, those municipalities with lower populations,
particularly populations under 1000 people, were less likely to have imposed a MAT. It is
hypothesized this is because these types of municipalities likely have no or very low
numbers of accommodations that could be taxed. If a smaller municipality does not have a
tourist base and either no or one or two accommodations, it likely does not make sense for
a municipality to pass a by-law imposing a MAT that will generate little to no revenue but
still require administrative resources. These very small municipalities were often the ones
that either lacked functional websites or their websites were not as up to date as other
municipalities in Ontario. Although the likelihood is low that these municipalities have
implemented a MAT that was not found by the researcher, it is possible it could have been
missed due to not having this information available online. With that in mind, it is
reasonable to assume that in the event a municipality’s MAT was missed in this research, it
is unlikely to materially impact the conclusions drawn in the analysis.
Methodology for Coding the Data and Limitations
For the discretionary portion of the MAT, a coding system was created where each
municipality that has an accommodation tax was assigned a category depending on how
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they are using the discretionary funds. The three categories utilized to bucket the use of
discretionary funds were as follows – tourism only; tourism and other; and other only. The
working hypothesis at the beginning of the research was that the discretionary MAT funds
are not being used to supplement tourism budgets, given a large portion of the revenue is
mandated to be used for tourism, and the funds are instead being used to offset spending
for other general budget line items.
Given the relative newness of the ability to levy a MAT in Ontario as outlined in
Table 1, the information was coded based on the intent that was stated or could be inferred
by the documentation reviewed. While it would have been ideal to have years of budget
data to compare stated intent versus actual expenditures, the MAT is simply too new in
many municipalities to be able to do so. Even for municipalities that were early adopters of
a MAT, there is administrative set-up that needs to occur. It takes time to both find or
create an eligible tourism entity for utilizing the portion of the funds that are mandated to
go to tourism, and to create a system to collect the funds. With the addition of the COVID-19
pandemic, which put many tourism initiatives on hold, in many municipalities we are just
beginning to see budget information as to where MAT revenue is being spent. Given this
limitation, the categorization for discretionary funds is primarily based on stated or
inferred intent of use of the revenue.
Table 1: Breakdown of Implementation Year of MAT By-laws
Year
# of By-laws

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

11

23

6

4

1
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When conducting this research and explaining each category, the use of case study
examples for each category is perhaps most instructive.
Case Studies
Tourism Only – The City of Cambridge
A good example of a municipality who intends to use the funds for tourism only is
the City of Cambridge. In the Council report outlining the MAT parameters, the City decided
to impose a 4% tax and directs staff to create a MAT Reserve Fund to segregate the City of
Cambridge’s portion of the MAT revenue for uses outlined in the report (City of Cambridge,
2019: 1). The staff report highlights that “it is important that the municipal share of funds
raised through the Municipal Accommodation Tax be segregated and only used for
approved municipal purposes to demonstrate transparency and accountability to the
hospitality industry” (City of Cambridge, 2019: 5).
An interesting component of the City of Cambridge’s MAT is that part of the revenue
is to be shared with the upper-tier municipality, the Region of Waterloo (City of Cambridge,
2019: 1). The way the MAT is set-up in Cambridge is that 50% of the revenue is to be
provided to the Waterloo Region Tourism Marketing Corporation (an eligible tourism
entity, as required by legislation); 40% of the revenue is to be kept by the City of
Cambridge and 10% of the revenue is to be provided to the Region of Waterloo (City of
Cambridge, 2019: 1). In conducting the research for this project, the Region of Waterloo
and its local municipalities were the only grouping of municipalities to share the revenue in
this manner, where MAT revenue is shared with the upper-tier municipality.
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Of the revenue retained by the City of Cambridge, the staff report provides that the
40% “would be used to support and enhance tourism, sport and cultural offering, as well as
major event attraction efforts in a variety of ways” (City of Cambridge, 2019: 8). The report
provides an appendix which lists potential uses for the City’s share of the MAT revenue,
with the intent that a formal policy be brought forward for Council approval to ensure the
segregated funds are only being used in accordance with the Council-approved reserve
fund policy (City of Cambridge, 2019: 24). The potential uses listed include market
research; tourism, sport and cultural infrastructure; bid and grant funding for international
national and provincial-scale events; major festival and event expansion/development;
sport/festival/event infrastructure; and additional staff resources to support tourism
efforts (City of Cambridge, 2019: 24).
When looking at the City of Cambridge’s 2021 Budget and Business Plan, the MAT
revenue shows as its own line item. On the reserve and reserve funds pages of the budget
document, there is a subsection under “Discretionary Reserve Funds” specifically for the
MAT revenue (City of Cambridge, 2020: 85). It is very clear that the funds are segregated
from the general pool of revenue so that they can be used for Council-approved tourism
purposes as outlined in the staff report approving the MAT.
Tourism and Other – The City of Toronto
The City of Toronto is a municipality which intends to use the MAT revenues for
tourism initiatives as well as other general municipal spending. Neither the by-law itself
nor the staff reports approving the MAT were helpful in determining how the discretionary
funds were going to be used. In addition, it was difficult to find information on the City of
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Toronto’s website that contained details about utilization of the MAT revenue. The website
is focused on end-users impacted by the MAT, such as hotel and short-term rental
providers, and providing them with information and resources.
However, the City of Toronto did publish a questions and answers document to
respond to commonly asked questions regarding the MAT. In this document, one of the
questions posed is what the tax revenue will be used for (City of Toronto, 2018: 1). The
response provided is that some of it will go towards supporting tourism but “the tax
revenue will also provide funds for the City to support programs and services, such as road
repair, transit, police, EMS, economic development, culture, parks and recreation, that
visitors have the ability to take advantage of when they visit Toronto” (City of Toronto,
2018: 1). While the response links the use of revenue to tourism, there are a number of
items that the revenue will be used for outside of tourism that are items the city would
spend on anyways.
In looking at City of Toronto budget documents, specifically at budget documents
pertaining to areas that the city noted would be utilizing MAT revenue, such as emergency
services, economic development and parks, there is no separation of MAT funding from
other revenue. Each Department has budget documentation pertaining to their respective
areas, but there is no breakdown to show where the MAT revenues are being utilized
within the budget.
The City of Toronto example demonstrates that the city will be using some of the
revenue generated from the MAT on general municipal expenditures. Without the MAT
revenue, the city would be spending on these line items anyways, but the addition of the
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MAT revenue allows the city to offset some of its typical spending on these budget items by
replacing some of the revenue with MAT funds. Theoretically, this could reduce the burden
on local property owners that pay property tax to the city, as the city is making
supplementary revenue from the MAT that offsets some of their spending.
Other Only – The City of Dryden
As mentioned previously in this paper, for some of the less populated municipalities
in Ontario, it was sometimes difficult to find information about the MAT, and more
specifically the use of revenue. Often their websites would contain little information
regarding the MAT, whereas some of the larger municipalities had dedicated webpages,
access to required forms and filings, and answers to frequently asked questions. When
reviewing documentation regarding the MAT at the City of Dryden, it was difficult to
discern what the funds would be used for as none of the documentation contained a clear
or definitive answer. In the staff report seeking approval to move forward with the MAT, it
was noted that 50% of the revenue would need to be provided to an eligible tourism entity
and 50% would be added to City of Dryden revenues (City of Dryden, 2019: 3 – 5) but the
report did not contain additional information regarding what the discretionary funds
would be used for. Budget documentation that was reviewed was also not very helpful. The
MAT revenue was included as a separate line item in the budget but included among all
other types of revenue received by the municipality, including transfers from reserve, cash,
rental and miscellaneous revenue (City of Dryden, 2021: 2). There was little to no
information about how the MAT revenue was going to be used.
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Without documentation that provided a clear indication of how the discretionary
MAT funds were going to be utilized by the city, a deeper dive needed to be undertaken to
assign a category for the city’s use of MAT funds. A telling quote from the City of Dryden’s
Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) was found in a local news report following approval of
the MAT. CAO Robert Nesbitt is quoted as saying “it’s exciting for the community as it
provides a new revenue stream [and for] the portion that comes back to the municipality, it
can be used for virtually any budgeted expenses within the municipality.” (Ebbeling, 2019:
1). To find out more information regarding how the money was going to be spent, videos of
Council meetings where the MAT was being discussed were viewed. In an October 2020
Committee of the Whole meeting where financial implications to the MAT revenue due to
COVID-19 were being discussed, the Treasurer noted that revenue was down 15% from
targeted levels. In response, Mayor Greg Wilson mentioned he was not concerned as the
MAT revenue is “found money” (City of Dryden, 2020).
Based on the information from the staff report, media interviews and the way the
Mayor spoke about the MAT revenues, the use of MAT funds for the City of Dryden was
categorized as other only because from the information available, it looks like this revenue
will just be added to the general coffers of the municipality instead of being allocated to any
specific item or initiative.
As illustrated above using the case studies, there were various avenues used to
determine the appropriate coding and categorization for how MAT revenue is being spent
in Ontario municipalities. Often this information was disclosed in staff reports, budget
documents, the by-law itself or in information contained on the municipality’s website.
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Occasionally however, the intended expenditure of the MAT revenues was not clearly
disclosed. It was sometimes necessary to go beyond Council and website documents to
review videos of Council meetings where the MAT was being discussed and review local
news articles in order to come to a determination for coding purposes.
In terms of the coding, there is a risk that there is bias in how the data is coded
depending on the interpretation of the documents reviewed. However, this risk is
mitigated as one reviewer was coding all the data collected. This leads to more limited
consistency issues because multiple people were not coding different sections of the data.
Ideally there would have been multiple people coding all the documents so they could be
compared for consistency purposes. However, this was outside of the scope of this
research project.

Analysis and Findings
In total, a little over 10% (45 of the 414) eligible municipalities in Ontario have
approved the implementation of a MAT and/or passed a MAT by-law. Somewhat
surprisingly, the majority of municipalities are using (or planning to use), MAT revenues
towards tourism initiatives or tourism and other, while only a handful intend to use the
funds for other budget items exclusively. The “other” category encompasses several
expenditures, such as road maintenance, transit, parks and recreation and supplementing
emergency services budgets.
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Table 2 – Breakdown of Utilization of MAT Revenues

# of municipalities

Tourism

Tourism and Other

Other Only

26

14

5

This finding is not in line with the hypothesis of this paper, which predicted most
municipalities would use the ability to levy a MAT as a revenue generation tool to offset
general municipal expenditures. Although there are municipalities utilizing the funds, or at
least part of the funds, for general purposes, the majority have earmarked these funds
exclusively for tourism initiatives. It is important to note that due to the accommodation
tax being so new in many municipalities, a lot of the categorization was completed based on
intended use of the funds versus actual use of the funds. An area of potential future
research would be to examine actual expenditures compared to intended utilization over
time.
Even for municipalities that implemented a MAT very soon after the regulation
permitted them to, it takes time in order to get the necessary administrative back-end
processes (i.e. creation of eligible tourism entity) established before the money can be
spent. This factor, combined with the timing of the COVID-19 pandemic putting a halt on
many major tourism initiatives, means that a lot of the MAT revenue has been collected but
not yet spent. An example of this is the City of Sarnia, which passed a MAT by-law in
February 2020, effective July 1, 2020. The original intent was to have Tourism SarniaLambton act as the eligible tourism entity, but there was disagreement about use of the
funds and administrative fees. In June 2021, Sarnia Council voted to “oust Tourism Sarnia-

34

Lambton as manager of the municipal accommodation tax funds and instead set up a grant
program under the umbrella of the city economic development with the 50 per cent of the
money that would have otherwise gone to the tourism organization, less administrative
and collection costs” (Kula 2021: 1). In this case, the accommodation tax had not even been
collecting funds for a year before disagreements arose, so the revenue collected has not
been spent. In addition, given the change in direction, the stated intention for use of the
revenue may change.
An interesting observation from the findings is the distribution throughout the
Province of municipalities that have imposed a MAT. The assumption would be that larger
municipalities with a strong hotel and tourism industry would be the main drivers of
municipalities in Ontario imposing a MAT. However, the results of the research indicate
that there is wide variability throughout Ontario. There are many municipalities in the
Greater Toronto Area that have not yet imposed an accommodation tax, which was a
surprising finding.
There are municipalities with strong tourism roots, such as the City of Kingston,
Prince Edward County and Huntsville, where it was expected to see a MAT being imposed
given the popularity of these areas within Ontario. However, it was surprising to see so
many smaller, northern municipalities that have imposed an accommodation tax, such as
the Town of Cochrane, City of Dryden, Town of Fort Frances, Town of Marathon, Sioux
Lookout and Red Lake. All the listed northern municipalities have populations of less than
10,000 people and are not known tourist destinations. It was surprising to find that these
municipalities have imposed a MAT at all.
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Perhaps less surprisingly is that except for Red Lake and Cochrane, all of these
municipalities were categorized as allocating the MAT revenue that they have discretion
over on tourism and other or other only. Only Red Lake and Cochrane indicated that the
funds would be spent exclusively on tourism initiatives. It is possible to hypothesize that
these smaller municipalities are looking for further avenues to generate revenue given
their relatively small property tax base. It would provide for interesting research to followup with these municipalities several years after the MAT has taken effect to see what has
actually been done with the revenue generated and what percentage of the funds are being
used for tourism initiatives versus funding of general municipal expenses.
The finding that most municipalities are intending to spend the discretionary
portion of the MAT revenue on tourism initiatives is in line with research completed by
Cetin et al. that studied willingness to pay for tourist taxes in Istanbul. Based on the
research in this study, tourists are willing to pay taxes if they are earmarked for
investments that might improve their experiences. Cetin et al. concluded that “funds
collected from tourism activity at a destination should be spent particularly on areas that
enhance tourist experience (i.e. general infrastructure, tourism superstructure, tourist
services and community welfare) in order to ensure long-term growth in tourist tax
revenues” (2017: 11). It is possible that Ontario municipalities, who are late adopters of
accommodation taxes based on a global comparison, have benefitted from the experience
of other jurisdictions. Research indicates that willingness for tourists to pay the
accommodation taxes is linked to their experience, so it makes sense to utilize the MAT
revenue to fund tourism initiatives that will enable municipalities to continue to charge, or
increase, accommodation taxes.
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Conclusion and Further Research
Accommodation taxes are becoming more widespread in Canada, and specifically
Ontario, while other jurisdictions such as the United States and Europe have levied these
types of taxes for a longer period. In Ontario, only a portion of the taxes collected must be
allocated to tourism initiatives by legislation, however, it is the intention for most
municipalities that have approved a MAT that the revenue collected that they have
discretion over will also be allocated to tourism. The findings were not aligned with the
hypothesis of this paper which predicted the new revenue would be used more frequently
to offset general municipal spending.
An area of further research would be to confirm in several years time if
municipalities that have implemented a MAT are doing what they intended with the
revenue or whether there has been dipping into the revenue for other purposes. In their
2006 study, Blackwell et al. examined local government compliance with accommodation
tax revenue earmarked for tourism promotion (2006: 212). They found that “local
governments do succumb to the temptation to use these funds for purposes other than
their intended purpose and that this tendency can be explained by the local governments’
proportion of the earmarked revenue to general revenue and the local governments’ level
of financial flexibility, measured by the proportion of the local governments’ budget held in
reserve.” (Blackwell et al., 2006: 213).
Blackwell et al. concluded that “the more financial flexibility the local government
has, the less inclined it will be to misuse tourism funds for other projects” (2006: 224). The
finding was that those municipalities with larger resources and reserves were less likely to
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redirect funds intended for tourism. This appears to align with my finding that a group of
smaller northern municipalities that have implemented a MAT intend to use the funds for
tourism and other general municipal spending, as these municipalities have a smaller
property tax base to draw from. In a few years time, reviewing the MAT revenue
expenditures of these municipalities to see how much is actually spent on tourism versus
allocated to general municipal expenses may add support for Blackwell et al.’s findings.
It will be interesting to see how this plays out in Ontario municipalities. Despite
intending to allocate the MAT revenue that they have discretion over to specific items,
largely tourism-related expenditures, it may be tempting for municipalities to utilize this
revenue to offset spending in other areas. This is particularly true for municipalities that
are strapped for resources. Follow-up research in several years comparing the intended
use versus the actual use of MAT revenue would prove informative.

38

References
Afonso, Whitney (2014). Local Sales Taxes as a Means of Increasing Revenues and
Reducing Property Tax Burdens: An Analysis Using Propensity Score Matching.
Public Budgeting & Finance 34: 24 – 43.
Association of Municipalities of Ontario (2017). Local Share – Imagining a Prosperous
Future for Our Communities.
Blackwell, Calvin, John C. Crotts, Stephen W. Litvin and Alan K. Styles. (2006). Local
Government Compliance with Earmarked Tax Regulation. Public Finance Review
34(2): 212 – 228.
Block, Sheila and Alexandra Weiss. (2015). Toronto’s Taxing Question: Options to Improve
the City’s Revenue Health. Ottawa: Canadian Electronic Library.
Bonham, Carl, Edwin Fujii, Eric Im and James Mak. (1992). The Impact of the Hotel Room
Tax: An Interrupted Time Series Approach. National Tax Journal 45(4): 433 – 441).
Cetin, Gurel, Zaid Alrawadieh, Mithat Zeki Dincer, Fusun Instabullu Dincer and Dimitri
Ioannides. (2017) Willingness to Pay for Tourist Tax in Destinations: Empirical
Evidence from Istanbul. Economies 5, 21: 1 – 15.
City of Cambridge. (April 2, 2019). Municipal Accommodation Tax Report. General
Committee Meeting. https://calendar.cambridge.ca/Council/Detail/2019-04-021900-General-Committee/0c8ebbd2-0ae7-4aea-99da-aa2400eac436.
City of Cambridge (2020). 2021 Budget and Business Plan.
https://www.cambridge.ca/en/your-city/Budget.aspx#.
City of Dryden (2019). Transient Accommodation Tax/Municipal Accommodation Tax.
Committee of the Whole, August 12, 2019. https://pubdryden.escribemeetings.com/filestream.ashx?documentid=5650.
City of Dryden (2020). Committee of the Whole Meeting Video. October 13, 2020.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zERU6IwPK4Y&t=4890s.
City of Dryden (2021). 2021 Operating Budget. https://www.dryden.ca/en/cityservices/resources/Documents/2021-Operating-Budget.pdf.
City of Toronto (2018). City of Toronto’s Municipal Accommodation Tax: Qs and As.
https://www.gtha.com/sites/default/files/MAT_QAs_GTHA_updatedMay25%20%20For%20Hotels%20%28web%29.pdf.
City of Toronto (2021). Budget Notes, Reports & Presentations.
https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/budget-finances/city-budget/notesreports-and-presentations/.

39

Clayton, Frank. (2017). Toronto has Plenty of Room for Increasing Residential Property
Taxes. Ryerson University Centre for Urban Research and Land Development.
Collins, Clay G. and E. Frank Stephenson. (2018). Taxing the Travelers: A Note on Hotel Tax
Incidence. Journal of Regional Analysis & Policy 48: 7 – 11.
Ebbeling, Mike. (2019). Dryden Adopting Hotel/Motel Accommodation Tax. CKDR News.
https://www.ckdr.net/2019/08/13/dryden-adopting-hotelmotel-accommodationtax/.
Gago, Alberto, Xavier Labandeira, Fidel Picos and Miguel Rodriguez. 2009. Specific and
General Taxation of Tourism Activities. Evidence from Spain. Tourism Management,
30: (381 – 392).
Heffer-Flaata, Hedvig, Augusto Voltes-Dorta and Pere Suau-Sanchez. 2021. The Impact of
Accommodation Taxes on Outbound Travel Demand from the United Kingdom to
European Destinations. Journal of Travel Research, 60(4): 749 – 760.
Hudson, Simon, Fang Meng, Kevin Kam Fung So, Scott Smith, Jing Li and Rui Qi. (2021). The
Effect of Lodging Tax Increases on US Destinations. Tourism Economics, 27(1): 205 –
219.
Kitchen, Harry and Enid Slack. (2016). More Tax Sources for Canada’s Largest Cities: Why,
What and How? IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance, 27.
Kula, Tyler. (2021). Sarnia Takes Control of City MAT Revenue Spending. The Sarnia
Observer. https://www.theobserver.ca/news/local-news/sarnia-takes-control-ofcity-mat-revenue-spending.
Lee, Seul Ki. (2014). Revisiting the Impact of Bed Tax with Spatial Panel Approach.
International Journal of Hospitality Management, 41.
Litvin, Stephen, John Crotts, Calvin Blackwell and Alan Styles. (2006) Expenditures of
Accommodations Tax Revenue: A South Carolina Study. Journal of Travel Research,
45:150-157.
McMillan, Melville and Bev Dahlby. (2014). Do Local Governments Need Alternative
Sources of Tax Revenue? An Assessment of the Options for Alberta Cities. The School
of Public Policy Publications, 7.
Ontario Regulation 435/17: Transient Accommodation Tax. (2017).
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/170435.
Plzakova, Lucie and Studnicka, Petr. (2021). Local Taxation of Tourism in the Context of the
Collaborative Economy – Case Study from the Czech Repubic. Journal of Local SelfGovernment, Vol. 19, No. 1.

40

Tassonyi, Almos N.E. Slack and Richard Bird. (2016). Can GTA Municipalities Raise
Property Taxes: An Analysis of Tax Competition and Revenue Hills. IMFG Papers on
Municipal Finance and Governance No. 20. Institute on Municipal Finance &
Governance. University of Toronto.

41

Appendix 1: List of Municipalities in Ontario with a Municipal
Accommodation Tax as of May 2021
Municipality

Effective Date of MAT

1.

Barrie, City of

January 1, 2019

2.

Belleville, City of

July 1, 2019

3.

Brockville, City of

May 1, 2018

4.

Cambridge, City of

July 1, 2019

5.

Cochrane, Town of

July 1, 2019

6.

Cornwall, City of

June 1, 2018

7.

Dryden, City of

January 1, 2020

8.

Fort Frances, Town of

January 1 2019

9.

Gananoque, Town of

December 31 2019

10.

Greater Sudbury, City of

September 1, 2018

11.

Hearst, Town of

12.

Huntsville, Town of

13.

Kapuskasing, Town of

14.

Kenora, City of

15.

Kingston, City of

16.

Kitchener, City of

17.

London, City of

18.

Marathon, Town of

19.

Markham, City of

20.

Mississauga, City of

21.

Niagara Falls, City of

22.

North Bay, City of

February 1, 2019

23.

Oakville, Town of

January 1, 2019

January 1 2019
April 1, 2019
July 1, 2019
September 1, 2018
August 1, 2018
July 1, 2019
October 1, 2018
June 1, 2019
January 1 2019
April 1, 2018
January 1, 2019
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24.

Orillia, City of

September 1, 2020

25.

Oshawa, City of

26.

Ottawa, City of

January 1, 2018

27.

Peterborough, City of

October 1, 2019

28.

Point Edward, Village of

January 1, 2020

29.

Prince Edward, County of

30.

Quinte West, City of

31.

Red Lake, Municipality of

32.

Sarnia, City of

33.

Sioux Lookout, Municipality of

January 1, 2020

34.

South Bruce Peninsula, Town of

January 1, 2022

35.

Stratford, City of

January 1, 2021

36.

Terrace Bay, Township of

January 1, 2020

37.

Thunder Bay, City of

38.

Timmins, City of

May 1, 2019

39.

Toronto, City of

April 1, 2018

40.

Vaughan, City of

April 1, 2019

41.

Waterloo, City of

July 1, 2019

42.

Wellesley, Township of

July 1, 2019

43.

Wilmot, Township of

July 1, 2019

44.

Windsor, City of

45.

Woolwich, Township of

April 1, 2021

February 1, 2021
July 1, 2019
January 1, 2021
February 10, 2020

September 1, 2018

October 1, 2018
July 1, 2019

